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A SINGLE SYMBOLIC DOLLAR: HOW
NOMINAL DAMAGES CAN KEEP LAWSUITS
ALIVE
Megan E. Carnbre*
The Eleventh Circuit's August 2017 opinion in
Flanigan's Enterprises v. City of Sandy Springs
deepened a circuit split regarding the role of
nominal damages in the justiciabilityanalysis. The
critical question is whether, in cases involving
constitutional violations, a claim for nominal
damages alone suffices to confer standing or to
defeat mootness when other forms of relief are
unavailable or moot. The Second, Fifth, and Ninth
Circuits have all held that nominal damages alone
are enough, but not without contention from
dissenting judges. The First, Third, Fourth,
Seventh, Eighth, and D.C. Circuitshave considered
the question-but have not conclusively decided its
answer. And the Sixth Circuit is unique in holding
that nominal damages may suffice to continue an
otherwise moot case but are not enough on their
own to establish standing. Although advocates
hoped the Supreme Court would use Flanigan's to
resolve the division among the courts of appeals, the
Supreme Court's March 2018 denial of certiorari
left the split among the circuits in place. Thus, the
federal courts' power to adjudicate cases of this
kind will depend on the jurisdictionin which they
sit instead of a uniform rule of justiciability. This
note seeks to explain why, for an alleged violation
J.D. Candidate, University of Georgia School of Law, 2019; B.B.A., Emory University,
2014. Special thanks to the editors of the Georgia Law Review for their revisions.
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of a constitutional right, a proper request for
nominal damages alone can confer standing and
prevent a finding of mootness. Nominal damages
provide the requisite personal interest at the onset
and throughout the course of litigation for three
reasons. First, nominal damages provide a legal
remedy by enabling suit; second, $1 is itself a
personal stake; and third, an award of nominal
damages changes the legal relationshipbetween the
parties.
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1.INTRODUCTION

Does a claim for nominal damages, absent other claims for
compensatory or prospective relief, provide the "requisite personal
interest" for a plaintiff to have a court decide a case on its merits?
This question has split the federal appellate courts and led to
vigorous dissenting and concurring opinions from the judges that
have considered the issue.1 One side argues that nominal damages
vindicate important rights, while the other contends that it is
wasteful to try an issue for such a triflingly sum. Since the Supreme
Court recently declined to review this issue, 2 the division among the
circuits continues to stand. 3 Thus, regardless of which rule is right,
the current doctrine fundamentally affects the power of federal
courts to adjudicate these claims depending on the jurisdiction in
4
which the plaintiff brings suit.
This Note will argue that a proper request for nominal damages
for an alleged violation of a constitutional right can confer standing
and prevent a finding of mootness, even when the conduct has
ended, there is no likelihood of reoccurrence, and absent other
claims for relief. While claims for nominal damages alone may be
actionable without proof of substantial injury in other contexts,
those are beyond the scope of this analysis due to the various
formulations of why an aggrieved party is entitled to nominal
However, so long as nominal damages serve as
damages.
vindication for a past deprivation of a legal right, then a proper
demand for nominal damages should be sufficient to support a legal
claim despite the absence of other forms of relief.
Part II will provide background on nominal damages, mootness,
and standing, as well as provide the first in-depth compilation of
current jurisprudence regarding the role of nominal damages in the
justiciability analysis. Given the number of circuits that have been
confronted with this issue, there is a surprising paucity of
scholarship addressing whether and why nominal damages are

1 See infra Part II.C.
2 Davenport v. City of Sandy Sprints, 868 F.3d 1248 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 2018
WL 1460786 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2018) (No. 17-869).
3 See Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 2, Davenport, 868 F.3d 1248 (No. 17-869) ('The
diviion it created among the courts of appeals can only be settled by [the Supreme] Court.").
4 Id. at 26-28.
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justiciable. 5 Part III attempts to fill this void by analyzing why
courts have the power to adjudicate claims for nominal damages
despite the absence or mootness of other forms of relief. Part IV
categorizes and addresses the most frequent rebuttals to the
argument that nominal damages alone are justiciable, and Part V
concludes.
II. BACKGROUND
Before analyzing the current landscape of judicial opinions on
nominal damages in the justiciability analysis, it is important to
first understand nominal damages and justiciability as independent
concepts.
A. NOMINAL DAMAGES

Nominal damages, by their nature, are minimal amounts
awarded as monetary damages.6 Generally, one dollar is awarded,
although higher amounts have been classified as a nominal
damages. 7 Courts award nominal damages on two occasions: (1) as
"damages recoverable where a legal right is to be vindicated against
an invasion that has produced no actual, present loss of any kind"
and (2) as damages awarded "when actual loss or injury is shown,"
but the amount of damages to be awarded was not proven.8

5 But see Mark T. Morrell, Who Wants Nominal Damages Anyway? The Impact of an
Automatic Entitlement to Nominal Damages Under § 1983, 13 REGENT U. L. REV. 225, 25557 (2000) (analyzing court opinions on nominal damages and mootness to demonstrate that
"[a]lthough the issue is not free from doubt," an automatic entitlement to nominal damages
would "defeat a claim of mootness" (quoting 1C MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN E. KIRKLIN,
SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS AND DEFENSES § 15.3, at 185 (3d ed. 1977)))); James E.
Pfander, Resolving the Qualified Immunity Dilemma: Constitutional Tort Claims for
Nominal Damages, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1601, 1619-20 n.88 (2011) (collecting cases to support
the author's argument that "the decision.., to waive all but nominal damages does not call
into doubt the existence of a genuine case or controversy within the meaning of Article III").
6 22 AM.JUR. 2D Damages § 8, Westlaw (database updated Feb. 2018).
7 Id. § 11.
8 Id. § 8; see also Nominal Damages, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (providing
two definitions of nominal damages: (1) when "there is no substantial loss or injury to be
compensated" and (2) "without regard to the amount of harm"); CHARLES T. MCCORMICK,
HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF DAMAGES § 20, at 85 (1935) ("[W]here the extent of the loss is not
shown, or where the right is one not dependent upon loss or damage ...").
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Nominal damages are available as a remedy in all types of cases. 9
They are also frequently awarded, even as a stand-alone award. In
a wide variety of cases, every federal appellate court has upheld or
granted awards that consist of only nominal damages. 10
In the constitutional context, the Supreme Court in Carey v.
Piphus unanimously held that nominal damages vindicate
deprivations of certain absolute rights even when no actual injury
Carey involved two students who were
has been proven.11
suspended from school without a hearing, in violation of their right
to due process. 12 The district court declined to award damages to
the students because there was no evidence in the record to quantify
the extent of their injuries. 13 The Seventh Circuit reversed and
found that, regardless of whether the students' suspensions were
justified, the students were entitled to substantial "nonpunitive"
damages due to the denial of their right to procedural due process. 14
The Supreme Court disagreed with the Seventh Circuit's theory
that substantial compensatory damages "flow from every
deprivation of procedural due process" without proof of an actual
injury, but the Supreme Court recognized that the students were
Given the
denied their right to procedural due process. 15
importance of procedural due process, the Supreme Court found
that these "absolute rights" should be "scrupulously observed" by

9 See, e.g., 22 AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 6, § 17 (breach of contract); § 18 (torts); § 19
(constitutional rights); § 20 (personal injury); § 21 (property rights); § 22 (breach of duty by
public officers); § 23 (fraud).
10 See, e.g., Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 105 (1992) (due process); Garretson v. Clark,
111 U.S. 120, 121 (1884) (patent infringement); Boston's Children First v. City of Boston, 395
F.3d 10, 11 (1st Cir. 2005) (equal protection); Gibeau v. Nellis, 18 F.3d 107, 111 (2d Cir. 1994)
(Eighth Amendment); United States ex rel. Tyrrell v. Speaker, 535 F.2d 823, 829-30 (3d Cir.
1976) (due process); Price v. City of Charlotte, 93 F.3d 1241, 1257 (4th Cir. 1996) (equal
protection); Archie v. Christian, 812 F.2d 250, 252 (5th Cir. 1987) (equal protection); Wolfel
v. Bates, 707 F.2d 932, 934 (6th Cir. 1983) (First Amendment); Briggs v. Marshall, 93 F.3d
355, 361 (7th Cir. 1996) (excessive force); Corpus v. Bennett, 430 F.3d 912, 914 (8th Cir. 2005)
(excessive force); Benton v. Or. Student Assistance Comm'n, 421 F.3d 901, 903, 909 (9th Cir.
2005) (free speech, free exercise of religion, due process, and equal protection claims);
Stoedter v. Gates, 704 F. App'x 748, 762 (10th Cir. 2017) (Fourth Amendment); Covenant
Christian Ministries, Inc. v. City of Marietta, 654 F.3d 1231, 1247 (11th Cir. 2011) (violation
of RLUIPA); Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co. v. Clay, 194 F.2d 888, 890-92 (D.C. Cir. 1952)
(breach of contract).
11 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978).
12 Id. at 251.
13 Id. at 251-52.
14 Id. at 252.
15 Id. at 263-64, 266.
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being "actionable for nominal damages without proof of actual
injury."16 The Supreme Court then remanded with instructions that
17
the plaintiffs were entitled to nominal damages.
These holdings were further affirmed in Memphis Community
School District v. Stachura.18 In Stachura,the Supreme Court found
that the abstract value of an infringed constitutional right, whether
procedural or substantive, could not be included in the calculation
of compensatory damages.1 9 Nominal damages, rather than an
uncertain estimation of the right's monetary value, "are the
appropriate means of 'vindicating' rights whose deprivation has not
20
caused actual, provable injury."
B. JUSTICIABILITY

Justiciability refers to the set of concepts used to determine what
controversies are appropriate for judicial determination. 2 1 These
concepts arise from constitutional limits on judicial power based on
the "case or controversy" requirement of Article III as well as
prudential limits such as remedial utility and judicial
administration. 22 Particular categories have been developed to
further identify when a case presents a justiciable controversy such
as ripeness, third-party standing, political question, and the two
23
most relevant for this analysis: standing and mootness.
1. Standing. Plaintiffs must have standing for a case or
controversy to be justiciable. 24 To demonstrate standing, the
plaintiff must show three things: (1) "an 'injury in fact'-an invasion
of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and
particularized, and (b) 'actual or imminent, not conjectural or
hypothetical,'" (2) "there must be a causal connection between the
injury and the conduct complained of," and (3) "it must be 'likely'"
that the "injury will be 'redressed by a favorable decision.' "25 While
16 Id. at 266.
17 Id. at 267.

18 477 U.S. 299, 308-10 (1986).
19 Id.
20 Id.

at 308 n.11.
21 See, e.g., 13 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3529

(3d ed. 2017).
22 Id. §§ 3529, 3533.
23 Id. § 3529.
24 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
25 Id. (citations omitted).
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the cases analyzed in Part III often involved issues implicating all
three prongs of the standing inquiry, for the purposes of this
analysis, 26 the focus is on the third element-whether an award of
nominal damages redresses the injury.
The redressability inquiry essentially asks: Would a plaintiff
"'personally... benefit in a tangible way from the court's
intervention' "?27 As the Supreme Court stated in Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Environment, it requires something more than
a plaintiffs happiness that "a wrongdoer gets his just deserts, or
that the Nation's laws are faithfully enforced." 28 "[P]sychic
satisfaction is not an acceptable Article III remedy because it does
not redress a cognizable Article III injury." 29 The relief must do
something to remedy the injury suffered. 30 In Steel Co, the Supreme
Court found that the plaintiffs had failed the redressability prong
of the standing test because the statutory civil penalties they were
seeking would flow to the United States Treasury, rather than the
plaintiffs themselves. 3 1 Since the plaintiffs were not positioned to
receive any monetary benefit, the Court found that the plaintiffs'
interest in punishment and deterrence was insufficient to support
32
Article III standing.
2. Mootness. Justiciability is not a one-time analysis. 33 The suit
must remain viable throughout the course of proceedings until the
final appellate disposition of the underlying claims. 34 A mootness
35
inquiry assesses if the case is still appropriate for judicial review.
Mootness, as the Supreme Court has said, is "the doctrine of
26 The author recognizes that a critical component of a recent case on this issue has been
framed as the appropriateness of nominal damages as a stand-alone remedy "against a
repealed ordinance that was never enforced." See Brief in Opposition at 21, Davenport v. City
of Sandy Springs, 868 F.3d 1248 (No. 17-869) (U.S. Feb 15, 2018). That question speaks
primarily to whether the plaintiffs suffered an actual, concrete injury rather than the
redressability of nominal damages. Thus, whether nominal damages are justiciable in that
particular instance is outside the scope of this analysis.
27 Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 103 n.5 (1998) (quoting Warth v.
Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 508 (1975)).
28 Id. at 107.

Id.
30 Id.
29

Id. at 105-06.
Id. at 106-07.
33 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 3533.
34 Id.; see also Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 45 (1997) ("To
qualify... for federal-court adjudication, an actual controversy must be extant at all stages
of review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.").
35 WRIGHT ETAL., supra note 21, § 3529.
31
32

Published by Digital Commons @ University of Georgia School of Law, 2018

7

Georgia Law Review, Vol. 52, No. 3 [2018], Art. 7

940

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 52:933

standing set in a time frame," that is, "[t]he requisite personal
interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation
36
(standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness)."
Demonstrating mootness is a heavy burden as it requires that the
issues presented no longer be 'live' and that neither party have a
37
"legally cognizable interest in the outcome."
A claim becomes moot, and thus inappropriate for judicial action,
when two conditions are met: (1) "'there is no reasonable
expectation...' that the alleged violation will recur" and (2)
"interim relief or events have completely and irrevocably eradicated
the effects of the alleged violation."38 Generally, if the challenged
conduct ends and " 'there is no reasonable expectation that the
wrong will be repeated,"'3 9 then prospective forms of relief, such as
declaratory judgments and injunctions, are advisory because they
40
provide no " 'effectual relief whatever' to [the] prevailing party."
Even though the effects of the alleged violation may not have been
"completely and irrevocably eradicated" in this situation, forwardlooking relief does not provide plaintiffs with any more of a remedy
than what they have in the moment. On the other hand, viable
claims for monetary damages will survive because intervening
events have not resolved plaintiffs' claims that they are entitled to
41
monetary payment for the alleged wrongful conduct.

36 Arizonans for Official English, 520 U.S. at 68 n.22 (quoting U.S. Parole Comm'n v.
Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397 (1980)).
37 Los Angeles County v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631 (1979) (citing Powell v. McCormack, 395
U.S. 486, 496 (1969)).
38 Id. (quoting United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629, 633 (1953)). Since mootness
is decided on a claim-by-claim basis, the remedies sought must provide some redress that
would otherwise be unavailable in the event that the effects of the alleged violation have not
been completely and irrevocably eradicated.
39 City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277, 287 (2000) (quoting WT. Grant Co., 345 U.S. at
633).
40 Id. (quoting Church of Scientology of Cal. v. United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12 (1992)). There
are exceptions and nuances to this general rule, such as how courts determine if there has
been complete discontinuance and whether the acts are "capable of repetition, yet evading
review." See generally WRIGHT ETAL., supra note 21, §§ 3533-3533.11. This Note focuses not
on whether a request for nominal damages should be treated like these exceptions, but on
whether nominal damages should be treated akin to other monetary damages.
41 See WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 3533.3 ("Untold numbers of cases illustrate the rule
that a claim for money damages is not moot, no matter how clear it is that the claim arises
from events that have completely concluded without any prospect of recurrence. The
Supreme Court has made the point several times.") (collecting cases).
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C. PUTTING IT TOGETHER: CASE LAW ON NOMINAL DAMAGES AND
JUSTICIABILITY

1. Mootness and Nominal Damages. The Eleventh Circuit's
August 2017 decision in Flanigan'sEnterprises,Inc. v. City of Sandy
Springs created a split among the federal appellate courts regarding
the role of nominal damages in the mootness inquiry. 42 In
Flanigan's,the Eleventh Circuit ruled that, on its own, a claim for
nominal damages in a constitutional violation case when the
conduct is not likely to reoccur is moot.4 3 In so doing, the majority
left open the possibility that nominal damages alone could save an
otherwise moot claim in other types of cases. 44 In Flanigan's, a
group of businesses and two intervenors challenged a city ordinance
that banned the sale of sexual devices. 45 They requested declaratory
and injunctive relief to strike down the ordinance and permanently
enjoin its enforcement as well as an award of nominal damages. 46 A
panel of Eleventh Circuit judges upheld the district court's
substantive findings given circuit precedent, but encouraged
47
appellants to petition for reconsideration of the decision en banc.
Appellants did so, and one week after the request for rehearing was
granted, the city council unanimously repealed the ordinance. 48 The
city then filed a motion to dismiss for mootness and, on the day of
oral argument, passed a resolution declaring that the ordinance had
never been enforced and disavowing any intent to reenact the
ordinance or similar regulation. 49 After hearing oral argument, the
en banc court concluded that there was no need to rule on the merits
since the issue no longer presented a live controversy. 50 Specifically,
42 See Alison Frankel, Come for the sex toys. Stay for the newly created circuit split on
mootness, REUTERS, Aug. 24, 2017, https://www.reuters.comlarticle/us-otc-mootness/comefor-the-sex-toys-stay-for-the-newly-created-circuit-split-on-mootness-idUSKCN1B42F2
("[Flanigan's]creates a split among the federal appellate courts on whether a claim for
nominal damages can keep an otherwise mooted case alive."); Petition for a Writ of Certiorari,
supra note 3, at 10 ("Every court of appeals to address the question presented here has
'resolved it differently' than the Eleventh Circuit.").
43 868 F.3d 1248, 1270 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 2018 WL 1460786 (U.S. Mar. 26,
2018).
44 Id. at 1263-64 n.12 ("[O]ur holding here does not foreclose the exercise of jurisdiction in
all cases where a plaintiff claims only nominal damages.").

45 Id. at 1253-54.
46 Id.

47 Id. at 1254.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Id.

at 1270.
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the majority held that because the challengers had "received all the
relief' they had requested by virtue of the city's repeal and
declaration, a ruling would do nothing more than "affix a judicial
51
seal of approval to an outcome that ha[d] already been realized."
This decision was made by a highly divided court. Five of those
sitting on the en banc panel joined a dissent which would have
allowed the claim for nominal damages to proceed to a
determination on the merits. 52 Instead of attempting to classify
some claims for nominal damages as worthy of adjudication while
leaving others to be dismissed as moot, the dissenting judges would
have created a "bright line rule allowing nominal damages to save
constitutional claims from mootness." 53 This rule would provide a
mechanism for redressing infringements even when there was no
claim of actual injury. 54 As acknowledged by the majority, the
55
dissent adopted the position of most other federal circuits.
While the Supreme Court has stopped short of "squarely
56
addressing the issue of mootness" in relation to nominal damages,
several courts have pointed to dicta in Arizonans for Official English
v. Arizona as support for the ability of nominal damages to sustain
justiciability. 57 In Arizonans for Official English, a state employee
attempted to challenge an amendment to Arizona's Constitution
that declared English to be the official language of the state. 58 Upon
her departure from state employment, the defendant suggested that
the plaintiffs claims for prospective relief were moot because she no
longer faced the fear of losing her job by refusing to perform her
official duties solely in English. 59 The Ninth Circuit held that a plea
for nominal damages could be read into her request for "all other
relief that the Court deems just and proper" and was thus sufficient

51 Id. at 1264, 1270.
52 Id. at 1271 (Wilson, J., dissenting). Judge Wilson was joined by Judge Martin, Judge
Jordan, Judge Rosenbaum, and Judge J. Pryor.
53 Id.
54

Id.

55 Id. at 1265 (majority opinion) ("[A] majority of our sister circuits to reach this question

have resolved it differently than we do today.").
56 Ward v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 35 F. App'x 386, 386 (5th Cir. 2002) (the Supreme
Court also denied certiorari in Flanigan'sEnterprises,Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, 868 F.3d
1248 (11th Cir. 2017), cert. denied, 2018 WL 1460786 (U.S. Mar. 26, 2018)).
57 Ward, 35 F. App'x at 386.
5' Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 48 (1997).
59 Id. at 48, 50.
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to allow the case to proceed to a decision on the merits. 60 On
remand, the district court awarded the plaintiff $1 in nominal
damages against the state of Arizona after the state expressly
61
waived its Eleventh Amendment immunity.
The Supreme Court ultimately dismissed the appealed case on
mootness grounds-but not on the obvious ground that nominal
damages do not present a justiciable controversy. 62 The Supreme
Court instead held that the claim for relief that the Ninth Circuit
relied on to overcome mootness did not exist because § 1983 claims
do not lie against a state.6 3 In so doing, the Supreme Court
acknowledged what it called the Ninth Circuit's "nominal damages
solution to mootness" in a footnote without ruling on whether
nominal damages themselves suffice to present a justiciable
controversy. 64 The Supreme Court also noted that the Ninth Circuit
should have been more cautious in finding that nominal damages
could revive the case due to the possibility that these had become
friendly proceedings and because the complaint did not specifically
65
request nominal damages.
After Arizonans for Official English, the Ninth Circuit has
continued to hold that "[a] live claim for nominal damages will
prevent dismissal for mootness."6 6 In Bernhardt v. County of Los
Angeles, the plaintiff challenged the county's policy of settling
federal civil rights cases for a lump sum including all attorney's
fees. 67 This practice, the plaintiff alleged, interfered with her
implied federal right to retain counsel in a separate civil rights
action against the county. 68 The plaintiff sought declaratory and
injunctive relief, compensatory, nominal, and punitive damages, as
well as attorney fees and costs. 6 9 Since the separate action of which
she was allegedly denied representation had been dismissed,
prospective relief would provide no benefit. 70 The court determined
that while the plaintiffs actual damages were speculative, her
Id. at 48, 60.
Id. at 63.
62 Id.
at 69.
63 Id.
64 Id.
at 69 n.24.
65 Id.
at 71.
66 Bernhardt v. County of Los Angeles, 279 F.3d 862, 872 (9th Cir. 2002) (collecting cases).
67 Id. at 866.
68 Id.
69 Id.
at 866, 872.
70 Id.
at 871.
60
61
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nominal damages claim presented a live controversy that avoided
mootness and enabled the court to make a determination on the
merits. 71 More recently, in 2017, the Ninth Circuit reached the
merits of a constitutional violation case despite the mootness of
prospective relief and the absence of a compensatory damages claim
because nominal damages were available to" 'make the deprivation
of such right actionable.' "72
The Fifth Circuit has also "consistently held that a claim for
nominal damages avoids mootness." 73 In Ward v. Santa Fe
Independent School District, after petition for rehearing, the
appellate panel concluded that the court's prior dismissal of the
nominal damages claim as moot was in error. 74 In the original case,
the district court and the appellate panel dismissed the case
because the student had graduated and the school policy had been
rescinded. 75 In the rehearing, the court cited to Carey and
Arizonans for Official English as well as other federal circuit cases
for its proposition that the claim for nominal damages meant the
76
case was not entirely moot.
In Utah Animal Rights Coalition v. Salt Lake City Corp., the
Tenth Circuit reaffirmed circuit precedent that nominal damages
alone are justiciable. 77 The Coalition's permit application to
demonstrate on public property at the 2002 Winter Olympics took
78
nearly eight months to process before ultimately being denied.
The Coalition sought compensatory, declaratory and injunctive
relief, as well as nominal damages for the "'harm suffered by the
[c]ity's delay and lack of specific written deadlines to process
applications.' -79 By the time the appeal reached the Tenth Circuit
71
72

Id. at 872.
Frudden v. Pilling, 877 F.3d 821, 828-30 (9th Cir. 2017) (quoting Jacobs v. Clark Cty.

Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419, 426 (9th Cir. 2008)).
73 Morgan v. Plano Indep. Sch. Dist., 589 F.3d 740, 748 (5th Cir. 2009) (collecting cases).
74 Ward v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 35 F. App'x 386, 386 (5th Cir. 2002).
75 Ward v. Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 34 F. App'x 150, 150 (5th Cir. 2002).
76 Ward, 35 F. App'x at 386. Although this opinion was unpublished, its ruling was cited
favorably in a later appeal of the same case and in another published circuit case. Ward v.
Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 F.3d 599, 602 (5th Cir. 2004) (per curiam); Morgan, 589 F.3d
at 748 n.32.
77 Utah Animal Rights Coal. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 371 F.3d 1248, 1257 (10th Cir. 2004)
(citing Comm. for the First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1526 (10th Cir. 1992);
O'Connor v. City & Cty. of Denver, 894 F.2d 1210, 1215-16 (10th Cir. 1990)).
78 Id. at 1250.
79 Id. at 1257 (quoting Brief of Appellant at 12, Utah Animal Rights Coal., 371 F.3d 1248
(No. 02-4174), 2002 WL 32737388, at *12).
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in 2004, the Olympics had long passed and the ordinance at issue
had been amended.8 0 As such, there was no possibility of recurrence
that would justify declaratory or injunctive relief.8 1 Although the
plaintiffs abandoned their compensatory damages claim, the court
ruled that their claim for nominal damages was sufficient to decide
8 2
the case on its merits.
The author of the majority opinion, Judge McConnell, wrote a
separate concurrence that only he joined.8 3 His opinion was a call
for either the en banc court or the Supreme Court to reverse prior
circuit precedent.8 4 In Judge McConnell's view, since there was no
retrospective relief that could make the Coalition whole nor was
there any possibility that the Coalition would be subject to the same
unconstitutional treatment in the future, a judicial ruling on
nominal damages would do nothing more than provide moral
satisfaction to the plaintiff.8 5 That moral satisfaction was not the
kind of real-world effect that should enable a judicial
86
determination.
87
Judge Henry wrote separately to respond to Judge McConnell.
He refuted the notion that a request for nominal damages alone
does not survive the mootness inquiry.88 As he emphasized, this is
because "an award of nominal damages is a judicially sanctioned
change in the parties' legal relationship," and if plaintiffs want to
vindicate the absolute right through nominal damages, there is still
8 9
a case or controversy that should be heard by the courts.
The Second Circuit has also held that a litigant does not lose
their right to proceed just "because only nominal damages are at
stake."90 In Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, the district court
dismissed as moot the plaintiffs § 1983 claims against the city and

80 Id.
81 Id.
82

Id.

83 Id. at 1262 (McConnell, J., concurring).
85

Id. at 1263.
Id. at 1264.

86

Id.

87

Id. at 1271 (Henry, J., concurring).

88

Id.

84

89 Id. at 1274-75.

90 Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 319 (2d Cir. 1999); see also Van Wie v.
Pataki, 267 F.3d 109, 115 n.4 (2d Cir. 2001) ("[Hiad the plaintiffs sought money
damages... this controversy would not be moot. Indeed, for suits alleging constitutional
violations... it is enough that the parties merely request nominal damages.").
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police department because recovery would be limited to nominal
damages. 91 The Second Circuit noted that the significance of a
nominal damage award lay in its ability to hold an "entity
responsible for its actions and inactions," to "encourage the
municipality to reform the patterns and practices that led to
constitutional violations," and to "alert the municipality and its
citizenry to the issue." 92 Citing to Carey, the court held that nominal
damages are "meant to guarantee that unconstitutional acts remain
actionable rather than to 'measure' the constitutional injury in any
meaningful sense."93 By refusing to allow the case to proceed, the
district court had impermissibly deprived the plaintiff of his ability
94
to vindicate the violation of his constitutional rights.
The First,9 5 Third, 96 Fourth, 97 and Eighth 98 Circuits have
similarly suggested that seeking nominal damages alone suffices to
make a claim justiciable. The D.C. Circuit has punted on the
question and assumed, for the resolution of a case on other mootness
grounds, that nominal damages would suffice to prevent a case from
becoming moot. 99 The Seventh Circuit has suggested, but has not
yet held, that nominal damages would be insufficient to sustain a
10 0
case or controversy.
91 Amato, 170 F.3d at 316-17.
92 Id. at 318.
93 Id. at 319.
94 Id. at 320.
95 See Cty. Motors, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding that
although "a claim for damages may prevent a case from becoming moot where injunctive
relief no longer presents a live controversy," the case was moot because the plaintiff had failed
to request nominal damages in his complaint).
96 See Burns v. Pa. Dep't of Corr., 544 F.3d 279, 284 (3d Cir. 2008) (finding that the
possibility of "at least" nominal damages for the deprivation of the plaintiffs constitutional
rights was enough to defeat a finding of mootness); see also Freedom From Religion Found.,
Inc. v. New Kensington Arnold Sch. Dist., 832 F.3d 469, 481 (3d Cir. 2016); infra notes 107108 and accompanying text.
97 See Covenant Media of S.C., LLC v. City of North Charleston, 493 F.3d 421, 429 n.4 (4th
Cir. 2007) ("Covenant's suit is not moot because if Covenant is correct on the merits, it is
entitled to at least nominal damages.").
98 See Advantage Media, L.L.C. v. City of Eden Prairie, 456 F.3d 793, 803 (8th Cir. 2006)
("Since Advantage might be entitled to nominal damages if it could show that it was subjected
to unconstitutional procedures, it has standing to assert these claims." (citing Memphis Cmty.
Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 n.l (1986)).
99 See People for the Ethical Treatment of Animals, Inc. v. Gittens, 396 F.3d 416, 421 (D.C.
Cir. 2005) ("We assume, without deciding, that a district court's award of nominal damages$1-prevents a case from becoming moot on appeal.").
100 See Lister v. Lucey, 575 F.2d 1325, 1336 (7th Cir. 1978) ("While drawing a firm line
between incidental damages and damages necessary to sustain a controversy is not necessary
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2. Standing and Nominal Damages. Some courts have focused
on the role that nominal damages play in the standing analysis
rather than addressing the issue on mootness grounds. In Morrison
v. Board of Education, a divided Sixth Circuit panel originally found
that the plaintiffs claim for nominal damages was justiciable. 10 1
That panel found the student's request for nominal damages for the
chill created by the school's speech code was "a symbolic remedy for
past wrongs" that defeated a finding of mootness and established
standing.102 The holding was later vacated and superseded when
the en banc court found that the student lacked standing to sue for
two reasons: (1) the chilling effect was not a concrete injury in fact
and (2) nominal damages would not redress past chill. 10 3 The court
further distinguished mootness and standing, finding that nominal
damages may continue an otherwise moot case but are not enough
on their own to establish standing.10 4 Lower courts in the Sixth
Circuit have continued to abide by this distinction1 0 5 and the
reasoning has been adopted by district courts outside the circuit to
10 6
deny standing for claims of nominal damages alone.
The Third Circuit, in Freedom from Religion Foundation,Inc. v.
New KensingtonArnold School District,found nominal damages can
confer standing for a plaintiff who had experienced incidental
contact with a ten commandments momentum located near his
here because of the significant amount of damages requested, it is important to note that
none of the cases cited by defendants involved more than nominal damages."); see also
Freedom From Religion Found., Inc. v. City of Green Bay, 581 F. Supp. 2d 1019, 1033 (E.D.
Wis. 2008) (finding that a claim for nominal damages was not sufficient to avoid mootness
challenges while recognizing that "neither the Supreme Court, nor the Seventh Circuit has
spoken decisively on the issue").
101 Morrison v. Bd. of Educ., 507 F.3d 494, 501 (6th Cir. 2007), opinion vacated and
superseded on reh'g, 521 F.3d 602 (6th Cir. 2008).
102 Id.
at 501.
103 Morrison v. Bd. of Educ., 521 F.3d 602, 610 (6th Cir. 2008).
104 Id.
at 611 ("While we may have allowed a nominal-damages claim to go forward in an
otherwise-moot case, we are not required to relax the basic standing requirement that the
relief sought must redress an actual injury." (citations omitted)).
105 See, e.g., Miller v. City of Cincinnati, No. 1:08cv550, 2012 WL 3962787, at *8 n.7 (S.D.
Ohio Sept. 11, 2012) ("[E]ven though Plaintiffs' case is otherwise moot, Plaintiffs' nominaldamages claim may go forward.").
106 See, e.g., Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. Mercer Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 1:17-00642,
2017 WL 5473923, at *6-7 (S.D. W.Va. Nov. 14, 2017) (discussing the Sixth Circuit's approach
and stating that the court agrees with the Sixth Circuit's reasoning). An appeal in this case
was filed with the Fourth Circuit on March 5, 2018 that may force that circuit to decide
whether nominal damages alone can confer standing when other forms of relief are
unavailable. See Appellants' Opening Brief, Deal v. Mercer Cty. Bd. of Educ., No. 17-2429
(4th Cir. Mar. 5, 2018).
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former high school's entrance. 10 7 The case did not touch on whether
nominal damages would sustain a mootness challenge because the
1 08
court remanded the case to determine organizational standing.
District courts in the Third Circuit have interpreted the holding in
New Kensington as enabling nominal damages to both confer
standing and defeat mootness. 10 9
Although Judge Smith joined the majority in New Kensington, he
wrote separately to clarify that nominal damages should not be
enough to establish standing or avoid mootness. 110 In his opinion,
nominal damages served, like declaratory relief, to provide
prospective relief that would not provide any tangible benefit.111
In addition to finding that nominal damages suffice to avoid
mootness, the Fifth and Ninth Circuits have also found that
nominal damages can redress an injury-in-fact and can confer
standing.112
3. States and Nominal Damages. Of the states that have
113 New Mexico, 114 New York, 115
considered the question, Montana,

107 Freedom from Religion Found., Inc. v. New Kensington Arnold Sch. Dist., 832 F.3d 469,
481 (3d Cir. 2016).
108 Id.
109 See, e.g., Pa. Gen. Energy Co. v. Grant Township, 2017 WL 1215444, at *8 (W.D. Penn.
2017) ("[New Kensington] impl[ies] that a request for nominal damages alone suffices to
create standing (and avoid mootness) to seek backward-looking relief." (citing New
Kensington, 882 F.3d at 476)).
110 New Kensington, 882F.3d 482 (Smith, J., concurring dubitante).
111 Id. at 485.
112 See, e.g., Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1124 (5th Cir. 1986) ("Because ... he could
receive at least nominal damages, he presented the district court with a case or controversy
sufficient to invoke the court's jurisdiction."); Jacobs v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 526 F.3d 419,
426-27 (9th Cir. 2008) ("Jacobs has standing to bring a non-moot claim for nominal damages
because she alleges an 'injury in fact' . . . that ... would be redressed if this court were to find
the policy unconstitutional.").
113 See Griffith v. Butte Sch. Dist. No. 1, 244 P.3d 321, 328 (Mont. Ct. App. 2010) (finding
that plaintiffs prayer "for nominal damages for violation of her constitutional rights prevents
this action from becoming moot").
114 See Carter v. City of Las Cruces, 915 P.2d 336, 337 (N.M. Ct. App. 1996) ("[E]ven if
injunctive relief has been rendered moot by the election, the potential for nominal
damages ...presents a continuing justiciable controversy which is not moot.").
115 See Coleman ex rel. Coleman v. Daines, 979 N.E.2d 1158, 1160 (N.Y. 2012) ("[The
plaintiffs] demand for nominal damages in connection with her alleged constitutional due
process violations also survives the mootness challenge".).
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Oregon, 116 and Washington1 17 have held that nominal damages can
save an otherwise moot claim, at least for violations of federal
constitutional rights. Tennessee has held that nominal damages
are insufficient to save an otherwise moot case. 118

III. WHEN ONE IS ALL You NEED: WHY NOMINAL DAMAGES ARE
SUFFICIENT TO PROCEED

There is no denying that the main benefit from an award of
nominal damages is symbolic. But nominal damages reach beyond
that. An award of nominal damages recognizes that a plaintiffs
right has been violated. 119 It further provides recovery for that legal
wrong.1 20 Nominal damages also enable plaintiffs to vindicate their
"absolute" rights to certain constitutional protections "through
enforcement of a judgment against the defendant."1 21 Thus, there
are three ways in which a claim for nominal damages provides the
"requisite personal interest" at the onset and throughout the course
of litigation: one, the ability to sue is the legal remedy; two, $1
provides a sufficient personal interest; and three, nominal damages
change the legal relationship between the parties.

116 See Barcik v. Kubiaczyk, 895 P.2d 765, 779 (Or. 1995) (finding that "a claim for nominal
damages for a past deprivation of a federal constitutional right withstands a challenge based
on mootness").
117 See Kuehn v. Renton Sch. Dist. No. 403, 694 P.2d 1078, 1080 (Wash. 1985) ("While
plaintiffs cannot be granted the declaratory relief.., since 42 U.S.C. § 1983 provides nominal
damages and attorney fees for civil rights violations, this issue remains to be resolved
between these parties.").
118 See Pylant v. Haslam, No. M2011-02341-COA-R3-cv, 2012 WL 3984648, at *4 (Tenn. Ct.
App. Sept. 11, 2012) ("The only relief sought was... for a declaration that the statute is
unconstitutional and for nominal damages resulting from that declaration. Because the
issues are moot, such relief is unavailable.").
119 See, e.g., Cummings v. Connell, 402 F.3d 936, 945 (9th Cir. 2005) ("An award of nominal
damages is intended to serve as a symbol that defendant's conduct resulted in a technical, as
opposed to injurious, violation of plaintiffs rights."); Redding v. Fairman, 717 F.2d 1105, 1119
(7th Cir. 1983) ("Nominal damages are not compensation for loss or injury, but rather
recognition of a violation of rights."); MCCORMICK, supra note 8, at 85 ("The award of nominal
damages is made as a judicial declaration that the plaintiffs right has been violated."); id.
C'Nominal damages are damages awarded... as a recognition of some breach of a duty owed
by defendant to plaintiff ...").
120 See, e.g., Cummings, 402 F.3d at 945 ("Recovery of nominal damages is important not
for the amount of the award, but for the fact of the award."); 22 AM. JUR. 2D Damages, supra
note 6, § 9 ('The allowance of nominal damages is generally based on the ground that every
injury, from its very nature, legally imports damage ...").
121 Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 115 (1992) (citing Carey v, Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266
(1978)).
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A. THE ABILITY TO SUE FOR NOMINAL DAMAGES IS THE LEGAL
REMEDY

To begin, it is worth recognizing the symbolic value that nominal
damages hold for many litigants. The ability to seek nominal
damages acts as a "separate and independent value" from the
monetary worth of compensatory damages. 122 That is, the benefit of
identifying and requesting relief for wrongdoing derives its value
not from the ultimate amount awarded, but from the fact that a
state sanctioned avenue to seek relief exists at all. 123 An award of
nominal damages reflects society's understanding that when rights
are absolute, the law should "not authorize the least violation of
it.' ' 124 These rights would be nonexistent if courts did not provide a
"method to secure their actual enjoyment," 125 as rights without a
remedy really do not exist.126
A judicial award of nominal damages enables litigants to hold an
"entity responsible for its actions and inactions" and to "alert the
municipality and its citizenry to the issue." 127
While these
incidental benefits on their own are not a sufficient hook to get into
federal court, 128 in cases involving constitutional violations, the
Supreme Court has provided a pathway for their realization via
129
nominal damages.
By making the denial of certain absolute rights "actionable for
nominal damages," the Supreme Court has provided a legally
cognizable interest, as well as the matching remedy, for these
rights, even when a plaintiff is unable to prove a substantive injury
resulted from its violation.13 0 The redressability inquiry focuses "on
122

Michael L. Wells, Civil Recourse, Damages-As-Redress, and Constitutional Torts, 46 GA.

L. REV. 1003, 1039 (2012).
123 Id. at 1009-10 (explaining civil recourse principle).
124 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *139.

Id. at *140-41.
See, e.g., Daryl J. Levinson, Rights Essentialismand Remedial Equilibration,99 COLUM.
L. REV. 857, 858 (1999) ("Rights are dependent on remedies not just for their application to
the real world, but for their scope, shape, and very existence.").
127 Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 318 (2d Cir. 1999).
128 See Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 107 (1998) (explaining that the
"psychic satisfaction" of getting a favorable judgment "is not an acceptable Article III remedy
because it does not redress a cognizable Article III injury").
129 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) (holding that, if the district court
determined that public school students' suspensions were justified, they would nevertheless
be entitle to nominal damages as they were deprived their right to procedural due process).
130 Id.; see also Flanigan's Enters., Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, 868 F.3d 1248, 1273 (11th
Cir. 2017) (Wilson, J., dissenting) ("[Ulnder Supreme Court precedent, one can bring a suit
125

126
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whether the injury that a plaintiff alleges is likely to be redressed
through the litigation." 131 In these constitutional violation cases,
where the injury is the deprivation of a right that cannot be shown
to have caused actual, provable injury, the remedy is then the
ability to sue for nominal damages. 132 If nominal damages in this
context are found to be non-justiciable, then they are not
actionable, 133 and plaintiffs lose the ability to vindicate their
absolute rights.
B. NOMINAL DAMAGES CONSTITUTE "RELIEF ON THE MERITS"

Nominal damages can also provide plaintiffs with the "requisite
personal interest" to support justiciability. The Supreme Court has
explicitly recognized that an award of nominal damages provides
"at least some relief on the merits. ' 134 Litigants who seek nominal
damages will be better off if the court decides in their favor-even
if that improvement is only by $1.
Depending on the circumstances, $1 can buy access to the courts.
Every federal appellate court has upheld awards consisting of only
There is no amount-in-controversy
nominal damages. 135
requirement for federal question jurisdiction.1 36 And, being forced
1 37
to pay nominal damages can constitute an "injury in fact."

solely for nominal damages, which means that nominal damages defy mootness on their
own.").
131Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 287 (2008).
132 Carey, 435 U.S. at 266.
133 Actionable, according to Merriam-Webster's Dictionary, means "subject to or affording

ground for an action or suit at law." Actionable, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriamwebster.com/dictionary/actionable (last visited Jan. 15, 2018).
Black's Law Dictionary
similarly defines actionable as "[flurnishing the legal ground for a lawsuit or other legal
action." Actionable, BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
134 Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532 U.S.
598, 603-04 (2001) (affirming Farrar);see also Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 116 (1992)

(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("One dollar is not exactly a bonanza, but it constitutes relief on
the merits.").
135 See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
136 See Mims v. Arrow Fin. Servs., LLC, 565 U.S. 368, 377 (2012) (describing the elimination
of the amount-in-controversy requirement for federal question jurisdiction as Congress
"[riecognizing the responsibility of federal courts to decide claims, large or small, arising

under federal law"); see generally Brief of DKT Liberty Project and Reason Foundation as
Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioners at 7-11, Davenport v. City of Sandy Springs, No. 17869 (U.S. Jan 16, 2018).
137 See, e.g., Sprint Nextel Corp. v. Middle Man, Inc., 822 F.3d 524, 528-29 (10th Cir. 2016)
("This award of nominal damages creates an injury in fact.").
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A monetary stake also provides the plaintiff with "more than the
right to sue," it gives the plaintiff the "right to exercise her
1 38
independent authority to direct the proceeds as she sees fit."
Thus, as at least some Justices have recognized, plaintiffs need only
to have a claim to a "dollar or two" to provide a "sufficient stake in
' 139
the litigation."
A litigant who wins nominal damages also has a personal
interest in being declared the prevailing party.1 40 That is, an award
of nominal damages reflects the judge's determination of the
41
substance of the case, rather than a procedural determination.
Thus, even though the litigant may have only recovered a nominal
sum, they have "succeed[ed] on a[] significant issue in litigation
which achieves some of the benefit the parties sought in bringing
suit. '142 This success may enable a plaintiff to recover attorney's
fees, even if limited in amount, 143 or be a peg on which to hang an
144
award of punitive damages.
C. NOMINAL DAMAGES CHANGE THE LEGAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
THE PARTIES

Lastly, nominal damages provide redress for a plaintiff by
changing the legal relationship between the parties. This change
occurs in three ways: first, nominal damages provide a plaintiff
138 Sprint Commc'ns Co. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 304 (2008) (Roberts C.J.,
dissenting). In Sprint, the majority found that the assignor-assignee plaintiffs had standing
based on their contractual obligations, while the dissent would have required the assignor to
have retained the right to some of the proceeds to have the requisite personal stake. Id. The
dissent also wrote that "Article III is worth a dollar" in describing why they rigidly adhered
to the formalism of a personal interest. Id. at 305.
139Id. (Roberts, C.J., dissenting).
140 Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 112 (1992)
141 Id.

142Id. at 109 (quoting Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424, 433 (1983)).
143See 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (2018) ("[T]he court, in its discretion, may allow the prevailing
party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the costs .. ");
Thomas A. Eaton & Michael L. Wells, Attorney's Fees, Nominal Damages, and Section 1983
Litigation, 24 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 829, 832 (2016) ("[S]everal circuit courts have held
that a substantial [attorney's] fee may be awarded even when the plaintiff obtains only
nominal damages."). While recognizing that after Lewis v.Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472,
480 (1990), an interest in attorney's fees alone is not enough to sustain an Article III case or
controversy, this demonstrates the practical effect that nominal damages can have on the
parties.
144 Moore v. Liszewski, 838 F.3d 877, 879 (7th Cir. 2016) ("[Slome courts hold
that ...nominal damages are 'actual enough' to... permit an award of punitive damages to
the plaintiff." (citations omitted)).
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substantive rights by virtue of being the prevailing party; second,
an award of nominal damages requires that the defendant pay the
plaintiff; and third, the party on whom the damages award is
imposed incurs legal rights and responsibilities via that judgment.
Several courts have recognized that an award of nominal
damages provides a substantive right to the prevailing party. For
example, the Ninth Circuit has held that providing a nominal
damages award of a "symbolic $1.00" to only the named plaintiffs,
and not to the other members of the class, would create a
"divergence of interests between the class representatives and the
absent class members." 145 The court held that "vindicat[ing] the
rights of the individually named plaintiffs differently as compared
to the absent class plaintiffs" would be in contravention of Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23, which requires that the substantive
rights of all class members be treated the same. 14 6 The Eight Circuit
has found that improperly instructing a jury in regard to an award
of nominal damages was a plain error that "affected [the plaintiffs]
substantial rights[ ] and that undermined the fairness of the
judicial proceeding." 147 Relying on this same reasoning, the Tenth
Circuit has also found that failure to instruct the jury with respect
to nominal damages prevents vindication of rights and amounts to
148
plain error that requires correction.
An award of nominal damages also has a practical effect on the
legal responsibilities of the party required to pay the award. The
Supreme Court unanimously held that an award of nominal
damages, no less than compensatory or putative awards, "modifies
the defendant's behavior for the plaintiffs benefit by forcing the
defendant to pay an amount of money [the defendant] otherwise
would not pay." 149 In another case, the Supreme Court reaffirmed
that an award of nominal damages is a "judicially sanctioned
change in the legal relationship of the parties," in a way that
voluntary cessation of behavior or unenforceable judicial
pronouncements are not. 50 Thus, as lower courts have found,

145
146
147

148
149
150

U.S.

Cummings v. Connell, 402 F.3d 936, 945 (9th Cir. 2005).
Id. at 944; FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
Risdal v. Halford, 209 F.3d 1071, 1073 (8th Cir. 2000).
Stoedter v. Gates, 704 F. App'x 748, 761 (10th Cir. 2017).
Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 113 (1992).
See Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep't of Health & Human Res., 532
598, 605-06 (2001) (explaining the difference between nominal damages/court-ordered
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prevailing on a nominal damages claim "holds that entity
responsible for its actions and inactions" 151 and creates an
"enforceable judgment requiring the alteration of defendant's
behavior." 152 And in class action cases, the amount the defendant is
1 53
required to pay could become quite high.
As further demonstration of the change in legal relationship, a
judgment of nominal damages also affects the losing parties' legal
rights. The Tenth Circuit has found that the requirement to pay
nominal damages creates a burden on the paying party sufficient to
constitute an "injury in fact" and confer standing.1 54 The Ninth
Circuit has allowed the paying party to contest the amount of the
nominal damages award.1 55 And, the Sixth Circuit has permitted a
party ordered to pay nominal damages to invoke Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 68 to recover post-offer costs if a pretrial offer of
1 56
settlement of a larger value was previously rejected.
Nominal damages provide redress by providing plaintiffs with an
avenue to sue, a symbolic validation that their rights have been
violated, and a right to recover a monetary benefit, and by changing
the legal rights and responsibilities of the parties involved in the
litigation.
Thus, nominal damages claims are generally
justiciable, 157 even in the absence of claims for compensatory or
putative damages or when requests for prospective relief are moot.
IV. RESPONDING TO WHY COURTS WOULD REFUSE TO RECOGNIZE
THESE MONETARY AWARDS AS WORTHY OF JUDICIAL
consent decrees and voluntary cessation of behavior for the determination of prevailing party
status).
151 Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 318 (2d Cir. 1999).
152 Cummings v. Connell, 402 F.3d 936, 946 (9th Cir. 2005).
153 See, e.g., Cummings v. Connell, 2006 WL 2264009, at *5-6 (9th Cir. Apr. 24, 2006)
(adding $44,433.94 of attorney's fees and expenses to the $37,000 nominal damages award);
Hohe v. Casey, 956 F.2d 399, 402, 416 (3d Cir. 1992) (affirming a nominal damages award of
$1 to each of the 18,000 nonmembers). But see Callahan v. Wallace, 466 F.2d 59, 62 (5th Cir.
1972) (denying a nominal damages award to each of the 50,000 class members because of
administrative inconvenience).
154 Sprint Nextel Corp. v. Middle Man, Inc., 822 F.3d 524, 528 (10th Cir. 2016).
155 Wiggins v. Rushen, 760 F.2d 1009, 1011-12 (9th Cir. 1985) (allowing the state to
challenge a nominal damages award of $250.00).
156 Pouillon v. Little, 326 F.3d 713, 719 (6th Cir. 2003) (ordering plaintiff to pay all postoffer costs since the $2 nominal damages award was "not more favorable" than the
defendant's initial $2,500 offer).
157 Of course, limits imposed by other justiciability doctrines such as ripeness, political
question, or the other elements of standing, may restrict what claims can ultimately be
adjudicated. See also infra Part I\V.D.
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DETERMINATION

There are generally five categories into which arguments against
recognizing nominal damages as warranting judicial determination
fall. These are: one, limits on the Court's jurisdiction based on
Article III "case or controversy"; two, comparisons of nominal
damages to declaratory or injunctive relief; three, caution against
deciding constitutional questions; four, destruction of the mootness
doctrine; and five, the triviality of using courts in this manner. The
following section will demonstrate why none of those arguments is
a barrier to justiciability.
A. NOMINAL DAMAGES DO PRESENT AN ARTICLE III CASE OR
CONTROVERSY

The primary argument against recognizing a claim for nominal
damages alone as sufficient to confer standing or defeat mootness is
the constitutional limit on justiciability provided by the "case or
controversy" requirement of Article 111.158 That limit requires a
litigant to have "suffered some actual injury that can be redressed
by a favorable judicial decision." 159
Nominal damages alone are justiciable because the award is a
form of redress for a violation of constitutional rights. As explained
in Part III, nominal damages enable a plaintiff to utilize courts to
recover damages, 160 change the behavior of the defendant, 16 1 and
change the legal relationship between the parties.1 62 Receiving
nominal damages thus provides the requisite personal interest for
a litigant to bring or continue a suit since nominal damages redress
the injury that defendants' conduct caused. As such, there is no
constitutional barrier to adjudicating claims for nominal damages
alone.

158 See, e.g., Flanigan's Enters., Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, 868 F.3d 1248, 1263-64 (11th
Cir. 2017) (majority opinion) (finding that the prayer for nominal damages did not present a
"live case or controversy" that would sustain Article III jurisdiction); Utah Animal Rights
Coal. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 371 F.3d 1248, 1266 (10th Cir. 2004) (McConnell, J., concurring)
(expressing concern that "litigants could manufacture Article III jurisdiction").
159 Iron Arrow Honor Soc'y v. Heckler, 464 U.S. 67, 70 (1983) (citing Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976)).
160 See supra Part III.A.
If1 See supra Part III.B.
162

See supra Part III.C.
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B. NOMINAL DAMAGES ARE FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT THAN
DECLARATORY OR INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

Many courts compare nominal damages to declaratory
judgments and injunctive relief for the purposes of the mootness
inquiry.16 3 In order to seek declaratory or injunctive relief, a litigant
must have a "specific live grievance" rather than a request as to
"what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts" or with
respect to "contingent future events that may not occur as
anticipated, or indeed may not occur at all."16 4 There is nothing
hypothetical or contingent when litigants seek nominal damages for
a violation of rights that has already occurred. There are two crucial
distinctions between nominal damages and declaratory judgments
that make these forms of relief incomparable for the mootness
inquiry.
First, declaratory judgements and injunctive relief are
prospective remedies, while nominal damages are retrospective.
Early supporters of declaratory judgments maintained that the
"great advantage" of this procedure was that it enabled an issue "to
be determined before breach or violence has occurred." 165 Similarly,
current legal scholars claim that declaratory judgments provide a
mechanism for adjudicating "an actual controversy that has not
reached the stage at which either party may seek a coercive
166
remedy."
Declaratory judgments provide a statement of the legal
relationship between the parties 167 while nominal damages
recognize a vindication of a past wrong. As one legal scholar
characterized declaratory judgments, the "purpose is to afford
163 See, e.g., Flanigan's, 868 F.3d at 1268 ("[N]ominal damages... may be closely
analogized to that of declaratory judgments."); Utah Animal Rights Coal., 371 F.3d at 1265
(10th Cir. 2004) (McConnell, J., concurring) ("Nominal damage awards serve essentially the
same function as declaratory judgments."); Morrison v. Bd. of Educ., 521 F.3d 602, 610 (6th
Cir. 2008) ("[N]ominal damages are a vehicle for a declaratory judgment.").
164 Lewis v. Cont'l Bank Corp., 494 U.S. 472, 479-80 (1990) (quoting Thomas v. Union
Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 580-81 (1985)).
165 Edwin M. Borchard, The Supreme Court and the Declaratory Judgement, 14 A.B.A. J.
633, 633 (1928).
166

1OB CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2751 (4th ed.

2017).
167 See, e.g., Herman L. Trautman, FederalRight Jurisdictionand the DeclaratoryRemedy,
7 VAND. L. REV. 445, 463 (1954) ("[T]he action for a declaratory judgment is ...intended to
permit the plaintiff to obtain an authoritative judicial statement of the legal relationship
existing between the parties ....).
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security and relief against uncertainty ... [i]t does not necessarily
presuppose culpable conduct on the part of the defendant ....

,168

Therefore, the benefit of a declaratory judgment lies in its ability to
shape future interactions and conduct of the parties. Nominal
damages, however, provide vindication for a prior violation of the
plaintiffs rights. 169 A judicial order of nominal damages recognizes
culpability on behalf of the defendant and forces a change in the
legal status of the parties to demonstrate that fact. 70 Thus,
nominal damages are a coercive remedy.
While nominal damages may incidentally function to declare the
rights of those parties involved, 171 the declaratory effect is not what
makes them actionable. That is, a court's ability to make a judicial
determination on nominal damages does not rely on the award's
potential declaratory effect, 72 but rather reflects the understanding
that when rights are absolute, the law should "not authorize the
"...
173 Absolute rights would be for not if the
least violation of it .
courts did not provide a "method to secure their actual
enjoyment."'174 In cases in which absolute rights are violated but no
substantial actual injury can be proved, the Supreme Court has
clearly held that nominal damages are the means by which those
175
rights should be vindicated.
For decades, scholars have called for the use of declaratory
judgments instead of nominal damages as the appropriate
procedure by which to define the rights of the parties. 176 Given this
backdrop, it is surprising that the Supreme Court would affirm that,

168 Edwin M. Borchard, The DeclaratoryJudgment-A Needed ProceduralReform, 28 YALE

L.J. 1, 4 (1918).
169 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
170 See supra Part III.
171 See, e.g., Utah Animal Rights Coal. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 371 F.3d 1248, 1264 (10th
Cir. 2004) (McConnell, J., concurring) (explaining the purpose of nominal damages in trespass
and libel actions).'
172 See, e.g., Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1551 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(explaining courts' broad power to adjudicate suits over private rights "even when plaintiffs
alleged only the violation of those rights and nothing more," as the causes of action are not
contingent on an allegation of damages beyond the violation itself).
173 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES, supra note 124, at *139.
174 Id. at *140.
175 Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978) (procedural due process); Memphis Cmty. Sch.
Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986) (substantive due process).
176 See MCCORMICK, supra note 8, § 20, at 96 ("Modern legislation... providing for
declaratory judgments, will probably diminish the need in future for the award of nominal
damages as a vehicle for a declaration of rights.").
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in the cases of constitutional violations, the appropriate remedy is
an award of nominal damages rather than a declaratory judgment.
To do so implicitly recognizes that nominal damages have a value
beyond declaring the rights of the parties for future conduct-they
177
function to vindicate past injustices to absolute rights.
The
Second, declaratory judgements are discretionary. 178
Supreme Court has repeatedly characterized the Declaratory
Judgment Act as "an enabling Act, which confers a discretion on the
179
courts rather than an absolute right upon the litigant."
Conversely, by making deprivations of absolute rights actionable,
the Supreme Court has given aggrieved parties a right to seek and
receive nominal damages when no substantive injury exists.
Given these differences, for the purposes of justiciability,
nominal damages should be treated as the monetary damages they
are, rather than akin to forms of forward-looking relief.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL AVOIDANCE DOCTRINE IS INAPPOSITE

Aside from the Article III constraints, some courts have invoked
the constitutional avoidance doctrine as a prudential reason not to
decide constitutional rights claims involving only nominal
damages.1 80 For at least one court, nominal damages did not rise to
the level of a "real, earnest, and vital controversy" that was
necessary to overcome the "great gravity and delicacy" inherent in
deciding constitutional questions.1 8 1 There are three reasons why
the constitutional avoidance doctrine does not preclude judicial
review of claims for nominal damages alone.
First, there should not be a separate prudential limit on whether
the Article III "case or controversy" is earnest or vital enough to
warrant judicial determination. As a recognition of their "absolute"

177 See, e.g., Comm. for First Amendment v. Campbell, 962 F.2d 1517, 1526 (10th Cir. 1992)
("The nominal damages claim ... relates to past (not future) conduct."); O'Connor v. City &
Cty. of Denver, 894 F.2d 1210, 1216 (10th Cir. 1990) ("[T]he nominal damages... were past
damages not affected by any changes in the Code.").
178 20 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., 20 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE DESKBOOK §
106 (3d ed. 2017) ("It is always discretionary with the court whether to entertain an action
for declaratory judgment.").
179 Wilton v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 278 (1995) (collecting cases).
180 See, e.g., Flanigan's Enters., Inc. v. City of Sandy Springs, 868 F.3d 1248, 1269 (11th Cir.
2017) (majority opinion) (noting that the Court "must generally pass on the constitutionality
of legislation unless" absolutely necessary for the determination of a controversy).
181 Id.
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nature, courts may not allow any invasion of constitutional rights.1 8 2
Courts must continue to hear these cases in order to "scrupulously
observe" absolute rights, which it would be unable to do if nominal
damages are insufficient to demand answers to these questions.
Second, the amount at stake does not necessarily demonstrate a
lack of vitality. For many litigants, nominal damages may be the
only avenue they have to secure the validation that their rights have
been violated. As d~monstrated in the cases outlined in Part II,
these litigants continue to have a real interest in seeing their rights
18 3
redressed, even if the only possible award is nominal damages.
Additionally, there is one crucial difference between standing
and mootness that may tip the scales in allowing an already
developed case to proceed: arguments for judicial economy weaken,
and may even run in the reverse direction, the further the case
proceeds.18 4 For example, litigation in Flanigan's begun shortly
after the ordinance passed in 2009,185 and continued until the
intervenor's petition for certiorari to the Supreme Court was denied
in 2018.186 To deny plaintiffs access to a decision on the merits
based on prudential grounds does little to save judicial resources at
that point. And at the very least, this progression demonstrates the
real and earnest commitment that these litigants have placed on
securing a judicial determination of their absolute rights.
D. RECOGNIZING NOMINAL DAMAGES DOES NOT DESTROY THE

MOOTNESS DOCTRINE

Despite concerns,18 7 allowing suits for nominal damages to go
forward would not destroy the mootness doctrine. There are other
ways in which claims for nominal damages can become nonjusticiable. For example, some cases will still be moot when the
182 See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 124, at *139 (stating "that the first and primary end
of human laws is to maintain and regulate these absoluterights of individuals").
183 See supra Part.II.C.

184 See, e.g., Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
170 (2000) ("[B]y the time mootness is an issue, abandonment of the case may prove more
wasteful than frugal.").
185 868 F.3d at 1253 (majority opinion).
186 See generally Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, supra note 3.
187 See, e.g., Flanigan's, 868 F.3d at 1270 (majority opinion) (allowing nominal damages
claims to proceed would "drastically reduce, if not outright eliminate, the viability of the
mootness doctrine"); Utah Animal Rights Coal. v. Salt Lake City Corp., 371 F.3d 1248, 1266
(10th Cir. 2004) (McConnell, J., concurring) ("[N]o constitutional case would ever become
moot.").
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cause of action itself does not survive, such as a plaintiffs death in
privacy or defamation cases.1 88 Or a defendant could moot the
18 9
nominal damages claim by offering to pay the requested sum.
There is also little incentive for plaintiffs to pursue claims for which
nominal damages would lose on the merits and for which they will
receive low attorney's fees. 190
Additionally, the burden is still on the plaintiff to demand
nominal damages. In most courts, failure to do so will properly lead
to a finding of mootness.1 91 Courts are reluctant to allow plaintiffs
to amend their pleadings to include a nominal damages claim or to
read a demand for nominal damages into an otherwise general
prayer for relief.1 92 And generally, counsel must maintain this
request throughout the litigation or risk disclaiming the nominal
damages claim.1 93 The way the plaintiff pleads a nominal damages
claim may also determine whether it is meant to vindicate a past
wrong or provide a remedy for future behavior, and could change

Utah Animal Rights Coal., 371 F.3d at 1273 (Henry, J., concurring).
Id.; see also TNS Media Research, LLC v. Tivo Research & Analytics, Inc., 629 F. App'x
916, 927 (Fed. Cir. 2015) ("Kantar agreed to pay TRA $1 in nominal damages,
thereby mooting the final issue left in the case."). But see Genesis Healthcare Corp. v.
Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 73, 82-83 (2013) (Kagan, J., dissenting) (criticizing the majority for
finding waiver, and thus "assum[ing], without deciding," that an unaccepted settlement offer
mooted the plaintiffs individual claims).
190 Utah Animal Rights Coal., 371 F.3d at 1273 (concurring, Henry, J.).
191 Cty. Motors, Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 278 F.3d 40, 43 (1st Cir. 2002) (finding that the
complaint was moot because the plaintiff did not present the request for nominal damages to
the district court).
192 See Arizonans for Official English v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 71 (1997) ("[A] claim for
nominal damages, extracted late in the day from Yniguez's general prayer for relief and
asserted solely to avoid otherwise certain mootness, bore close inspection."); Fox v. Bd. of
Trustees, 42 F.3d 135, 141-42 (2d Cir. 1994) ("We are especially reluctant in these
circumstances to read a damages claim into the Complaint's boilerplate prayer for 'such other
relief as the Court deems just and proper,' or to conclude that the district court should have
exercised its discretion to permit an amendment of the Complaint to seek nominal
damages.").
193 See, e.g., Oliver v. Falla, 258 F.3d 1277, 1281-82 (11th Cir. 2001) (collecting cases)
("Several other courts, in a variety of cases, have held that a plaintiff may waive nominal
damages."); Sims v. Mulcahy, 902 F.2d 524, 536 (7th Cir. 1990) (holding that plaintiffs failure
to instruct the jury on the mandatory nature of nominal damages abrogated her ability to
raise the issue on appeal); Warren v. Fanning, 950 F.2d 1370, 1374 (8th Cir. 1991) (holding
the same). But see Robinson v. Cattaraugus Cty., 147 F.3d 153, 162 (2d Cir. 1998) (remanding
for an entry of nominal damages despite jury instructions because the plaintiff was entitled
to nominal damages as a matter of law).
188

189
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the justicability analysis as the prospective remedy would still be
moot. 194
E. NOMINAL DAMAGES ARE NOT TRIVIAL

Finally, some judges have indicated that allowing suits for
nominal damages alone trivializes the role of courts by forcing
adjudication over minimal amounts of money. 195 This is a flawed
way of thinking of this problem for two reasons.
First, while the amount of nominal damages may be negligible,
it does not mean they have no value. "Nominal relief does not
necessarily a nominal victory make. ' 196 Defining the issue's
importance based only on the award amount dangerously overlooks
197
the significance of the underlying dispute.
The purpose of constitutional and civil rights tort litigation is to
vindicate rights and to deter future violations. 198 Vindication
usually takes the form of compensatory or putative damages, but in
lieu of those, or when they cannot be proven, nominal damages are
the appropriate remedy. 199 Nominal damages "provide plaintiffs
with access to the courts to obtain meaningful redress for the
violation of their rights. ' 200 That is, aside from any monetary relief,

194 See, e.g., Freedom from Religion Found, Inc. v. New Kensington Arnold Sch. Dist., 832
F.3d 469, 485 n.6 (3d Cir. 2016) (Smith, J., concurring) (discussing the difference in
requesting nominal damages related to wrongful past contact as compared to compensation
for having to alter future behavior).
195 See, e.g., Morrison v. Bd. of Educ., 521 F.3d 602, 611 (6th Cir. 2008) (majority opinion)
("Allowing [the case] to proceed... in the hope of awarding the plaintiff a single
dollar.., trivializes the important business of the federal courts."); Amato v. City of Saratoga
Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 322 (2d Cir. 1999) (Jacobs, J., concurring) (noting that a trial over
nominal damages is a "wasteful imposition on the trial judge and on the taxpayers and
veniremen").
196 Farrar v. Hobby, 506 U.S. 103, 121 (1992) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (explaining that not
"all nominal damages awards are de minimis').
197 See, e.g., Eaton & Wells, supra note 143, at 851 ("The danger lies in putting too much
emphasis on litigation 'success,' and then measuring success by the amount of money
awarded, as though constitutional torts were like any other type of tort litigation."); City of
Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 562 (1986) ("Unlike most private tort litigants, a civil rights
plaintiff seeks to vindicate important civil and constitutional rights that cannot be valued
solely in monetary terms.").
198 See Eaton & Wells, supra note 143, at 851 ("In any given case, the inquiry ought to be
whether the vindication and deterrence goals of constitutional tort law were served by the
litigation.").
19"Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978); Memphis Cmty. Sch. Dist. V. Stachura, 477
U.S. 299, 308 n.l (1986).
200 Wells, supra note 122, at 1031.
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a judgement on a claim for nominal damages is a mechanism to
vindicate the "plaintiff's own rights. '20 1 The primary purpose of
nominal damages then is not their ability to measure the impact of
the deprivation, but to guarantee that when rights are infringed,
20 2
plaintiffs have a forum to act upon those violations.
Second, when declaratory or injunctive relief is unavailable,
nominal damages cases can provide needed clarity and prevent
stagnation in constitutional tort law, which helps deter other
violations. 20 3 Thus, allowing these cases to proceed utilizes federal
courts for their purpose in enforcing and advancing constitutional
rights. 204 Denying the plaintiff their day in court ensures that the
whole nation, not just the individual plaintiff, suffers because issues
20 5
of the "highest importance" go "unvindicated."
V. CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has consistently held that nominal damages
are the appropriate mechanism to vindicate constitutional rights
that have been infringed without causing actual, provable injury.
As long as nominal damages are the way in which violations of
constitutional rights are to be safeguarded and upheld in the cases
of no actual injury, then they must be enough to render a claim
justiciable. This is true regardless of whether forward-looking or
compensatory forms of relief are still available.
Nominal damages provide sufficient redress for the injury to
constitute a justiciable controversy. To safeguard the importance of
procedural due process and other absolute rights, courts must be
able to adjudicate these controversies even when no actual injury is
proved. Unlike forms of prospective relief, nominal damages

Id.
Amato v. City of Saratoga Springs, 170 F.3d 311, 318 (2d Cir. 1999) ('The primary
purpose of nominal damages ...is thus to guarantee that a defendant's breach of these duties
will remain actionable regardless of their consequences in terms of compensable damages.").
203 See, e.g., id. (noting that nominal damages can "alert the municipality and its citizenry
to the issue"); Pfander, supra note 5, at 1628 (arguing the benefits of suspending qualified
immunity for nominal damage actions to clarify constitutional norms to clearly establish law).
204 See, e.g., Morrison v. Bd. of Educ., 521 F.3d 602, 623 (6th Cir. 2008) (Moore, J.,
dissenting) ("[T]he majority's peevish sense that the instant action is a waste of the federal
courts' time minimizes the federal courts' essential role in protecting free expression under
the First Amendment.").
205 City of Riverside v. Rivera, 477 U.S. 561, 575 (1986); see also Amato, 170 F.3d at 317-18
(finding that nominal damages can have great value to society).
201

202
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provide a retrospective remedy for violations that have previously
occurred. When courts refuse to adjudicate these claims on the
basis that nominal damages do not suffice to present a live
controversy, they undermine the ability of these absolute rights to
be actionable and, most regrettably, deny litigants the benefits of
redress.
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